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15.1 Introduction
The relationship between copyright and privacy is complex: copyright
and privacy may be mutually reinforcing or may conflict.1 This chapter
explores the relationship between copyright and privacy in the context of
discovery of identities of internet users allegedly committing copyright
infringements by use of peer-to-peer (P2P), principally BitTorrent,
networks.
The open internet facilitates mass copyright infringement and mass
surveillance.2 The prevalence of online infringement has seen the emer-
gence of a copyright surveillance industry.3 Monitoring P2P networks
enables detection of Internet Protocol addresses (IP addresses), but not
identities. An identity associated with an IP address can be ascertained
only with assistance of an internet service provider (ISP), which main-
tains logs matching IP addresses to subscribers. To bring actions against
alleged infringers, rights holders may need court orders requiring ISPs to
disclose identities.
* Sam Ricketson introduced me to copyright in the LLM program at Melbourne Law
School in the early 1990s and has been a mentor and colleague since. He was chief
investigator on an Australian Research Council–funded project on data privacy law that
I was fortunate to contribute to. Given Sam’s formidable body of work in intellectual
property law, readers may be less familiar with his contributions to privacy law and policy.
For example, from 2001 to 2010 Sam was a commissioner of the Victorian Law Reform
Commission (VLRC), where he had responsibility for its workplace privacy reference.
1 David Lindsay and Sam Ricketson, ‘Copyright, privacy and digital rights management
(DRM)’ in Andrew T Kenyon and Megan Richardson (eds.), New Dimensions in Privacy
Law (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), p. 121.
2 Shoshana Zuboff, The Age of Surveillance Capitalism (London: Profile Books, 2019); Sonia
K Katyal, ‘The new surveillance’ (2003) 54(2) Case Western Reserve Law Review 297;
Sonia K Katyal, ‘Privacy vs piracy’ (2004) 7 Yale journal of Law & Technology 222.
3 Mike Zajco, ‘The copyright surveillance industry’ (2015) 3(2) Media and Communication
42; Ramon Lobato and Julian Thomas, ‘The business of anti-piracy: New zones of
enterprise in the copyright wars’ (2012) 6 International Journal of Communication 606.
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Common law jurisdictions have procedures for pre-trial identity dis-
covery from non-parties.4 Due to the risk of ‘speculative invoicing’ courts
have imposed limits on the use of disclosed identities. Speculative invoi-
cing involves collecting identities linked to IP addresses ostensibly for the
purpose of litigation, then issuing letters of demand offering to settle for
less than the costs of defending litigation but more than is recoverable in
an infringement suit.5 There is no intention to litigate, as the strategy is
designed to create an incentive to settle to avoid litigation costs.6 While
courts acknowledge that, in this context, identity disclosure entails con-
flicts between copyright and privacy, preventing speculative invoicing has
been the main express reason given for imposing limits on identity
discovery.
This chapter examines the extent to which courts granting identity
disclosure from ISPs satisfactorily address conflicts between copyright
and privacy. The chapter is confined to discovery in the UK, Canada and
Australia, as there are similarities in the law but also significant differ-
ences, especially in the recognition of rights. The chapter argues that the
protection of rights in this context casts light on how common law courts
take account of rights, and balance rights, in exercising judicial
discretions.
15.2 Rights Balancing and Proportionality
Before the relationship between copyright and privacy is addressed,
we must clarify one point: if there is a conflict, what is in conflict? This
chapter assumes that copyright and privacy laws protect rights.
‘Rights’ terminology is used normatively, even in relation to Austra-
lian law (where there is no bill of rights), as it recognises the special
weight or moral force of rights: regardless of the theoretical perspec-
tive, ‘rights’ are a distinctive form of moral or legal obligation, con-
ventionally given greater weight than ‘interests’ which, unlike rights,
4 Other jurisdictions have similar procedures: Frederica Giovanella, Copyright and
Information Privacy (Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar, 2017), p. 29.
5 David D’Amato, ‘BitTorrent copyright trolls: A deficiency in the federal rules of civil
procedure?’ (2014) 40 Rutgers Computer and Technology Law Journal 190; Matthew Sag,
‘Copyright trolling, an empirical study’ (2015) 100 Iowa Law Review 1105.
6 Patience Ren, ‘The fate of BitTorrent John Does: A civil procedure analysis of copyright
litigation’ (2013) 64 Hastings Law Journal 1343.
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are subject to utilitarian trade-offs.7 Internationally, ‘rights balancing’
is the preferred means for addressing conflicts between copyright and
privacy.8
There are many ways to analyse rights conflicts.9 For example, some
rights, such as the right not to be tortured, may be given ‘lexical prior-
ity’10 over other rights, such as freedom of expression.11 In a book-length
analysis of the balance between copyright and privacy in identity disclos-
ure orders, Giovanella has argued that courts faced with rights conflicts
apply ‘conceptual balancing’, giving priority to the right ‘to which the
legal system as a whole attaches more importance’.12 But, while courts
often seem influenced by some form of rights ordering, judicial reasoning
is not as systematic as Giovanella suggests, commonly being no more
than an implicit ranking. Moreover, in practice, as the UK Supreme
Court has observed, applying balancing (in the form of proportionality
analysis) ‘depends to a significant extent upon the context’.13 Therefore,
this chapter does not pursue comparative ranking of copyright and
privacy – such as might arise from conceiving copyright as protecting
‘economic rights’ and privacy as protecting ‘personality rights’ – but
assumes that, in general, the rights should be given equal weight, with
outcomes depending on context.
What, then, does the context of applications for identity disclosure
from ISPs tell us about the relationship between copyright and privacy
rights? On the one hand, as a right entails its vindication, a copyright
holder should have a right to discover the identity of alleged infringers, as
a prerequisite to vindicating its rights. On the other hand, the right to
(data) privacy generally prohibits disclosure of personal information held
by a third party, unless justified.14 The issue facing courts is therefore not
7 Ronald Dworkin, Taking Rights Seriously (London: Duckworth, 1977); Jeremy Waldron,
‘Rights in conflict’ (1989) 99 Ethics 503.
8 We do not, however, have to go so far as Giovanella, who claims that resolving rights
conflicts is the ‘predominant task’ of courts: Giovanella, Copyright and Information
Privacy, 6.
9 Frances Myrna Kamm, ‘Conflicts of rights: Typology, methodology, and
nonconsequentialism’ (2001) 7 Legal Theory 239.
10 On ‘lexical ordering’ see John Rawls, A Theory of Justice (Oxford: Oxford University
Press, 1971), pp. 42–4.
11 Waldron, ‘Rights in conflict’, 513–15.
12 Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy, 42.
13 R (Lumsden) v. Legal Services Board [2016] AC 697, 717.
14 Reflected in the purpose limitation principle of data privacy law, which prohibits use or
disclosure of personal information otherwise than for the purpose for which it was
collected unless it is justified: Lee Andrew Bygrave, Data Privacy Law: An International
Perspective (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014), pp. 153–7.
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which of the two rights is weightier in the abstract, but whether, in this
context, identity disclosure is justified (and, if so, to what extent)?
In dealing with conflicts between rights (or between rights and inter-
ests), the proportionality principle is the dominant international standard
for justifying rights infringements.15 Proportionality is, nevertheless,
highly contested,16 and subject to different formulations.17 It is neither
possible nor desirable to enter into these controversies here, except for
two brief points. First, while proportionality and balancing are some-
times equated,18 proportionality is but one form of balancing, for which
special advantages are claimed.19 Second, the claimed advantages
include that, as a constrained form of legal reasoning, proportionality
escapes allegations of subjectivity and arbitrariness;20 it directs attention
to considerations that may be overlooked;21 and it recognises rights are
weightier than interests.22
15.3 Conditions for Identity Discovery
This section identifies the conditions that must be satisfied for courts to
grant identity discovery against non-parties in the three jurisdictions.
15 Alec Stone Sweet and Jud Mathews, ‘Proportionality, balancing and global
constitutionalism’ (2008–9) 47 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 72; Aharon
Barak, Proportionality: Constitutional Rights and Their Limitations (Oxford: Oxford
University Press, 2012).
16 See the collection of essays in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber
(eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge:
Cambridge University Press, 2014).
17 Martin Luterán, ‘The lost meaning of proportionality’ in Grant Huscroft, Bradley W
Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law: Rights,
Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014), p. 21; Bradley
W Miller, ‘Proportionality’s blind spot: “Neutrality” and political justification’ in Grant
Huscroft, Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of
Law: Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014),
p. 370.
18 Charles-Maxime Panaccio, ‘In defence of two-step balancing and proportionality in
rights adjudication’ (2011) 24 Canadian Journal of Law and Jurisprudence 109.
19 Luterán, ‘The lost meaning of proportionality’, 23–5.
20 Robert Alexy, ‘On balancing and subsumption. A structural comparison’ (2003) 16(4)
Ratio Juris 433; Aharon Barak, ‘Proportionality and principled balancing’ (2010) 4 Law
& Ethics of Human Rights 1.
21 Miller, ‘Proportionality’s blind spot’.
22 Frederick Schauer, ‘Proportionality and the question of weight’ in Grant Huscroft,
Bradley W Miller and Grégoire Webber (eds.), Proportionality and the Rule of Law:
Rights, Justification, Reasoning (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014),
pp. 173, 177.
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In the UK, the availability of identity discovery from a non-party was
for long unclear23 and only conclusively resolved in Norwich Pharma-
cal.24 Despite variations in how courts have expressed the conditions for
making an order, it is accepted that the following must be satisfied:
1. A wrong must have been arguably carried out.
2. The person against whom the order is sought must be mixed up in the
wrongdoing so as to have facilitated it, and is likely able to provide the
necessary information.
3. The applicant must be intending to seek redress (by court proceed-
ings or otherwise, such as by disciplinary action or dismissal of an
employee) for the alleged wrongs.
4. Disclosure of the information must be necessary to pursue the
redress.25
While the UK Civil Procedure Rules provide for disclosure against non-
parties, the court’s power to make a Norwich order is expressly
preserved.26
In both Canada and Australia, pre-trial identity discovery is provided
for by court rules (although Norwich orders remain available), but the
relationship between the rules and Norwich orders differs between the
two countries.
In Canada, identity discovery is relevantly27 governed by rule 238 of
the Federal Court Rules.28 In BMG Canada Inc v. Doe,29 however, the
Federal Court of Appeal held that the principles for making an order
under rule 238 were the same as those for making Norwich orders.30
While UK courts have held that the applicant for a Norwich order must
establish there is an arguable wrong, the threshold is imprecise.31
23 While Bray suggested that an exception allowed a bill of discovery to be filed against a
non-party to discover the name of a potential defendant, authority was scant: Edward
Bray, The Principles and Practice of Discovery (London: Reeves and Turner, 1885), p. 40.
24 Norwich Pharmacal Co v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133 (cited as
Norwich Pharmacal). In Cartier International AG v. British Sky Broadcasting [2018]
1 WLR 3259, the UK Supreme Court held that Norwich orders were part of a more
general duty imposed on a non-party that is ‘mixed up’ in a wrongdoing not to assist in
that conduct, which may consist in providing information to a rights holder, but is not
confined to that.
25 The Rugby Football Union v. Viagogo Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 1585 (Court of Appeal); Koo
Golden East Mongolia v. Bank of Nova Scotia [2008] 2 WLR 1160.
26 Civil Procedure Rules 1998 (UK) SI 1998/3132, r. 31.18.
27 In the context of discovery for copyright infringements.
28 Federal Court Rules, SOR/98-106, r. 238. 29 [2005] 4 FCR 81 (cited as BMG).
30 Ibid., [30]-[31].
31 United Company Rusal Plc v. HSBC Bank Plc [2011] EWHC 404, [50]-[52].
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In BMG, however, the court rejected the suggestion that the applicant
must demonstrate a prima facie case, concluding it was sufficient to
establish the lesser threshold of a bona fide claim.32 In addition to a
bona fide claim, the BMG court held that an applicant must show
evidence that the information cannot be obtained from another source
and does not cause undue costs to the non-party.33
In Australia, the relevant provision is rule 7.22 of the Federal Court
Rules,34 which provides that an applicant must satisfy the court of
multiple factors, including that there may be a right to obtain relief
against a prospective respondent and that the applicant is unable to
ascertain the description of the prospective respondent. Unlike Norwich
orders, the non-party need not be ‘mixed up’ in the wrongdoing.35
Moreover, in Australia, while an order will not be granted in aid of
‘merely speculative proceedings’,36 the applicant need not establish a
prima facie case.37 The Australian rules therefore set a lower threshold
than Norwich orders.38
15.4 Discretion to Grant Identity Disclosure
Identity disclosure orders are discretionary. As the conditions for making
an order may be readily satisfied,39 orders for discovering identities from
ISPs have, in practice, depended upon the exercise of the court’s discre-
tion. Courts in the three jurisdictions dealt with in this chapter have
reached similar conclusions in assessing identity discovery applications:
granting discovery subject to conditions safeguarding against speculative
invoicing. But, while conflicts between copyright and privacy have been
addressed by the courts, the reasoning on the balance between the rights
has differed in the three jurisdictions. This section identifies the
differences.
32 BMG [2005] 4 FCR 81, [34]. 33 Ibid., [35].
34 Federal Court Rules 2011 (Cth) r. 7.22.
35 See Ashworth Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 515, [35].
36 Levis v. McDonald (1997) 75 FCR 36, 44.
37 Hooper v. Kirella Pty Ltd (1999) 167 ALR 358, 366.
38 Nicolas Suzor, ‘Privacy v intellectual property litigation: Preliminary third party
discovery on the internet’ (2004) 25 Australian Bar Review 227, 248.
39 Alexandra Sims, ‘Court assisted means of revealing identity on the internet’ in Chris
Nicoll, J E J Prins and Miriam J M van Dellen (eds.), Digital Anonymity and the Law:
Tensions and Dimensions (The Hague: TMC Asser Press, 2003), pp. 271, 274.
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15.4.1 The UK
In the UK, prior to the Human Rights Act 1998 (UK), the discretion to
grant a Norwich order involved courts balancing public interest consider-
ations.40 Since then, however, exercising the discretion has required
courts to determine whether an order is proportionate, applying Euro-
pean jurisprudence.41 More recently, this has entailed reference to the
right to data privacy under Article 8 of the Charter of Fundamental
Rights of the European Union (EU Charter).42
In the principal authority on Norwich orders, Viagogo,43 the Supreme
Court drew from prior case law to identify ten factors relevant to exercis-
ing the discretion, noting that many are ‘self-evidently relevant to the
question of whether the issue of a Norwich order is proportionate’.44 The
factors most relevant to proportionality included (2) the strong public
interest in allowing an applicant to vindicate his or her legal rights, (7) the
degree of confidentiality of the information sought, (8) the privacy rights
under Article 8 of the European Convention of Human Rights (ECHR)
of the individuals whose identity is to be disclosed, and (9) the rights and
freedoms under EU data protection law of the individuals whose identity
is to be disclosed.45
The main UK authority on identity discovery from an ISP, Golden
Eye,46 was an application by rights holders in pornographic films, either
as exclusive licensees or on behalf of others. Holding that the court’s
discretion was reducible to proportionality analysis based on a balance
between rights of copyright holders and privacy rights of subscribers,
Arnold J identified the ‘correct approach’ as follows:
(i) neither [right] as such has precedence over the other; (ii) where the values
under the two [rights] are in conflict, an intense focus on the comparative
importance of the specific rights being claimed in the individual case is
necessary; (iii) the justifications for interfering with or restricting each right
must be taken into account; (iv) finally, the proportionality test – or ‘ultimate
balancing test’ – must be applied to each.47
40 Norwich Pharmacal Co v. Customs and Excise Commissioners [1974] AC 133, 182 (per
Morris LJ); British Steel Corp v. Granada Television Ltd [1981] AC 1096.
41 Ashworth Hospital Authority v. MGN Ltd [2002] 1 WLR 515, [36], [57]; R (Mohamed)
v. Secretary of State for Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs (No 1) [2009] 1 WLR
2579, [94].
42 [2010] Official Journal of the European Union C 83/389, art. 8.
43 Rugby Football Union v. Consolidated Information Ltd [2012] 1 WLR 3333 (cited as
Viagogo).
44 Ibid., 3339. 45 Ibid.
46 Golden Eye (International) Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch); Golden Eye
(International) Ltd v. Telefonica UK Ltd [2012] EWCA Civ 1740 (cited as Golden Eye).
47 Golden Eye [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch), [117], applying Re S [2005] 1 AC 593.
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Arnold J held that, in this case, an order was proportionate in that the
claimant’s interest in enforcing their copyrights outweighed the prospect-
ive defendants’ interest in protecting their privacy, provided the order
incorporated safeguards to prevent speculative invoicing. In relation to
the application made for other owners, however, Arnold J held that an
order would be disproportionate as it would involve sale of the defend-
ants’ privacy to the highest bidder (namely, the applicants). Subse-
quently, the Court of Appeal overturned Arnold J on this point,
concluding that there was no relevant distinction between Golden Eye’s
claims and those made on behalf of others.48
In Viagogo, the Supreme Court approved Arnold J’s approach to
proportionality. In doing so, however, the court rejected an argument
that it would ‘generally be proportionate’ to make an order once it was
established there was an arguable wrong and no other realistic way of
discovering the identity of the alleged wrongdoer, with Lord Kerr observ-
ing that the privacy rights of an individual could:
in some limited instances, displace the interests of the applicant for the disclosure
of the information even where there is no immediately feasible alternative way in
which the necessary information can be obtained.49
15.4.2 Canada
In Canada, the Federal Court of Appeal in BMG held that the exercise of
the court’s discretion required determining whether the public interest in
disclosure outweighed ‘legitimate privacy concerns’,50 as protected
under the federal data privacy law, PIPEDA.51 In addressing the conflict
between copyright and privacy, however, Sexton JA concluded that:
Although privacy concerns must also be considered, it seems to me that they
must yield to public concerns for the protection of intellectual property rights in
situations where infringement threatens to erode those rights.52
Although the appeals court affirmed the first instance ruling denying
discovery, this was on the basis of inadequacies with the evidence.
Giovanella, accordingly, seems to over-state the significance of the case
when she regards it as supporting her conclusion that, applying
48 Golden Eye [2012] EWCA Civ 1740, [28].
49 Viagogo [2012] 1 WLR 3333, 3347 [28]. 50 BMG (2005) FCA 193, [15].
51 Personal Information Protection and Electronic Documents Act, SC 2000, c. 5.
52 BMG (2005) FCA 193, [41].
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‘conceptual balancing’, Canadian courts give more weight to privacy
than to copyright (at least relative to other jurisdictions).53
In the main case applying BMG to disclosure of subscriber names
associated with downloading torrent files, Voltage Pictures,54 the Federal
Court granted the order, concluding that the rights of the copyright
holder outweighed the privacy rights of internet users,55 largely on the
basis that ‘(p)rivacy considerations should not be a shield to wrong-
doing’.56 The court went on, however, to point out that the order must
ensure that ‘privacy rights are invaded in the most minimal way pos-
sible’.57 While the court considered that users of BitTorrent networks
had no ‘reasonable expectation of privacy’,58 it held that safeguards were
required to protect users against speculative invoicing.59 The safeguards
included ensuring that the information released remains confidential and
is used only in connection with the proposed action.60
15.4.3 Australia
In the principal Australian case dealing with identity discovery from
ISPs, Dallas Buyers Club,61 Perram J held that the conditions for discov-
ery were satisfied, before turning to the court’s discretion. Accepting the
relevance of privacy concerns, the judgment referred to the privacy
obligations of ISPs imposed under two relevant data privacy laws.62 In
both cases, however, disclosure is permitted when required or authorised
by law, such as by a disclosure order.63 While Perram J acknowledged a
conflict between copyright and privacy – and the need for courts to ‘try
and accommodate both rights as best they can’64 – like the UK and
Canadian courts, he held this could be achieved by imposing safeguards
on disclosure. The safeguards imposed included that email addresses not
be disclosed and that disclosed identities be used solely for the purpose of
legal proceedings.
Concerned at the potential for speculative invoicing, Perram J stayed
the order to permit scrutiny of the applicant’s letter of demand. In a
subsequent application to lift the stay, however, Perram J held that
53 Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy, 310–12.
54 Voltage Pictures LLC v. Doe (2014) FC 161 (cited as Voltage Pictures). 55 Ibid., [57].
56 Ibid., [54]. 57 Ibid., [57]. 58 Ibid., [59]. 59 Ibid., [60]. 60 Ibid., [134].
61 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited (2015) 245 FCR 129 (cited as Dallas Buyers
Club’.
62 These are the Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) and the Privacy Act 1988 (Cth).
63 See Telecommunications Act 1997 (Cth) s 280; Privacy Act 1988 (Cth) sch 1,
Australian Privacy Principle 6.2(b).
64 Dallas Buyers Club (2015) 245 FCR 129, 149 [86].
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supervision of correspondence with subscribers undertaken by the courts
in Golden Eye and Voltage Pictures was based on:
the fact that in both the United Kingdom and Canada there are human rights
instruments which guarantee privacy, the application of which requires the
Courts in those countries to engage in a proportionality analysis foreign to
Australian law.65
While Perram J concluded that Australian courts could not exercise such
overarching supervision, he held that a degree of supervision was author-
ised to ensure the disclosed information was used for obtaining relief and
not for any ulterior purpose.66 The applicant rights holder subsequently
announced it would not challenge termination of proceedings.
15.5 Copyright and Privacy: Rights-Based Analysis
Taking rights seriously involves establishing a principled means for
determining limits on rights, including limits arising from rights balan-
cing. When evaluating rights conflicts, however, there are dangers in
courts being influenced by unexpressed values, leading to arbitrariness.
Structured legal analyses are a means for defending against arbitrariness
and subjectivity.
In contrast to traditional common law reasoning, rights-based
reasoning is top-down, entailing application of high level principles to
facts. A difficulty is that, while it is comparatively easy to formulate
abstract tests, applying such tests to facts risks introducing subjectivity
and arbitrariness. And yet, the application of rights-based analysis (such
as proportionality) is, as courts acknowledge, highly context depend-
ent.67 In application, rights-based analysis can degenerate into the pro
forma,68 with courts paying lip service to rights but with outcomes
hinging on unstructured, multi-factor tests. The reasoning of common
law courts determining applications for identity discovery therefore illus-
trates broader problems. In the context of the discretion to award identity
discovery orders, the analysis of the relationship between copyright and
65 Dallas Buyers Club LLC v. iiNet Limited (No 4) (2015) 327 ALR 702. 66 Ibid., [8].
67 The distinction between balancing of abstract rights and balancing of rights as applied to
specific cases is also known as the distinction between ‘definitional balancing’ and ‘ad
hoc balancing’: Melville B Nimmer, ‘The right to speak from times to time: First
Amendment theory applied to libel and misapplied to privacy’ (1968) 56 California
Law Review 935; Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy, 12–14.
68 As Aleinikoff puts it, balancing can degenerate into ‘mechanical jurisprudence’:
T Alexander Aleinikoff, ‘Constitutional law in the age of balancing’ (1987) 96 Yale
Law Journal 943.
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privacy has, even in the UK (where courts are required to apply ‘propor-
tionality’), been unduly unstructured and, therefore, unsatisfactory.69
Is there a way for the analysis to be improved, so rights conflicts are
more clearly acknowledged and resolved? To begin, recall how rights-
based analysis differs from other legal ‘balancing’. Common law balan-
cing, such as traditionally occurred in the exercise of the discretion to
award discovery, entails weighing ‘public interest’ factors in what has
been termed ‘a broad brush, and sometimes opaque, analysis aimed at a
resolution of the rights and interests involved’.70 Compared with rights-
based approaches, such as proportionality, common law balancing fails
to expressly give special weight to rights, is less structured and is more
likely arbitrary.
But top-down, rights-based analyses are difficult for courts to apply.71
Take, for example, the reasoning of the UK courts in Golden Eye and
Viagogo. In Golden Eye, Arnold J set out an abstract framework (the
‘correct approach’) for determining whether an interference with privacy
rights is proportionate.72 While, in Viagogo, the Supreme Court
approved this framework, it also held that the ‘essential purpose’ of a
Norwich order is ‘to do justice’, which involves ‘the exercise of discretion
by a careful and fair weighting of all relevant factors’.73 The court then
identified ten factors, only some of which are relevant to rights-based
proportionality.74
What does this tell us about common law courts applying rights-based
analyses? First, consider the paradox of how rights-based analysis aims to
avoid reducing rights to utilitarian balancing, yet rights conflicts involve
trade-offs. The absence of an accepted form of weighing arguably quali-
tatively equivalent rights, such as copyright and privacy, appears to result
in courts gravitating to unstructured, multi-factorism. What seems to be
needed is the development of second-order rules – what Schauer refers to
as ‘rules of weight’75 and Luizzi as ‘specific guides’76 – so as to better
69 As Giovanella points out in relation to identity discovery jurisprudence in the US,
Canada and Italy, judges ‘have found themselves struggling to understand which right
should prevail’: Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy, 36.
70 Benjamin J Goold, Liora Lazarus and Gabriel Swiney, ‘Public protection,
proportionality, and the search for balance’ (Research Paper No. 10/07), UK Ministry
of Justice, 2007, i.
71 For a controversial attempt at integrating rights-based analysis with common law
reasoning see Trevor R S Allan, Constitutional Justice, A Liberal Theory of Law (Oxford:
Oxford University Press, 2001).
72 Golden Eye [2012] EWHC 723 (Ch), [117].
73 Viagogo [2012] 1 WLR 3333, 3338 (emphasis added). 74 Ibid., 3339.
75 Schauer, ‘Proportionality and the question of weight’, 178.
76 Vincent Luizzi, ‘Balancing of interests in courts’ (1980) Jurimetrics 373, 394.
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bridge the gap between high-level principles and factual context. While it
seems that the factors identified by the Supreme Court in Viagogo were
intended to serve this purpose, they are too general and diffuse and
insufficiently tailored to resolving rights conflicts.
Second, and more controversial, establishing ‘rules of weight’ or ‘spe-
cific guides’ should, as potentially hinted by Arnold J in Golden Eye,
involve some substantive analysis of the values and interests underpin-
ning the respective rights.77 For example, as pointed out by the court in
Voltage Pictures, the right to privacy is not intended to shield wrongdoers.
On the other hand, in that case, the court apparently held that, apart
from the risk of ‘speculative invoicing’, users of P2P networks have no
‘reasonable expectation of privacy’, as they necessarily reveal an IP
address.78 This would seem, in some way, to reduce privacy to a right
not to be subject to ‘speculative invoicing’, when the two (privacy and
speculative invoicing) are distinct.
In short, in the exercise of the court’s discretion, privacy has been
paid lip service, with the value and importance of online anonymity
not being referred to79 and systemic threats of surveillance ignored.
A potential benefit of rights-based reasoning, however, is the ability for
courts to take account of system-wide effects, such as surveillance
practices, extending beyond the individual case.80 Moreover, the
reluctance of common law courts to engage in substantive analysis of
the relationship between rights may potentially explain how, in the
relevant cases, the relationship between copyright and privacy has
been subsumed by concerns about speculative invoicing. This is not
to say that avoiding the potential for speculative invoicing is unimport-
ant. The underlying issue, however, is the extent to which reasoning
in the exercise of judicial discretion is properly structured. If rights
are to be prioritised, then analysis of interference with privacy should
not be conflated with the potential economic harms of speculative
invoicing.
It may be helpful, at this point, to illustrate weaknesses in the reasoning
of the courts by providing a sketch of what a rights-based approach to
77 This conclusion may be similar, but is certainly not identical, to Giovanella’s ‘conceptual
balancing’: Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy. For example, I do not agree
that ‘concepts’ of rights are necessarily jurisdiction specific.
78 Voltage Pictures (2014) FC 161, [59]-[60].
79 See, for example, Julie E Cohen, ‘A right to read anonymously: A closer look at
“copyright management” in cyberspace’ (1996) 28 Connecticut Law Review 981.
80 McFadden points out that ‘sophisticated’, as opposed to ‘elementary’, balancing takes
into account societal interests beyond the facts of the particular dispute: Patrick
M McFadden, ‘The balancing test’ (1988) Boston College Law Review 585, 586.
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the exercise of the discretion to award identity discovery might look like.
The privacy rights of internet users, consisting of a right not to have
personal data disclosed for a purpose other than the purpose of collec-
tion, will be breached unless disclosure is justified. Disclosure may be
justified where it is necessary to protect other rights, such as the right of
copyright owners to vindicate their rights. But disclosure should be
restricted to what is strictly necessary to vindicate the relevant rights.
Therefore, it must be limited to where there is a genuine intention to
vindicate rights, by bringing an infringement action or good faith settle-
ment negotiations, but not for other purposes, such as speculative
invoicing. The problem with speculative invoicing is therefore not that
it is an infringement of privacy, but that identity disclosure for that
purpose would be a disproportionate infringement of the right to priv-
acy (whereas disclosure for the purpose of legitimate litigation is gener-
ally not). Similarly, the litigation agreement in Golden Eye, which
provided for the applicant to bring actions on behalf of other owners,
was problematic not because it involved trading privacy rights (as
suggested by Arnold J), but because it risked privacy being infringed
for an illegitimate purpose (that is, a purpose apart from vindicating
rights).
So far, in this section, we have not distinguished rights-based analyses
in general from proportionality analysis. Proportionality, as a constrained
form of rights-based reasoning, promises much, including safeguarding
against subjective and arbitrary reasoning. Like any form of high-level
reasoning, however, it is not a panacea. That is why this chapter suggests
that the critical proportionality sub-test – proportionality stricto sensu
(that a limitation on a right must not impose excessive burdens on other
rights or interests)81 – needs to be supplemented by ‘rules of weight’ or
‘specific guides’.
In the cases dealt with in this chapter, which reach similar conclu-
sions but by different routes, it is hard to criticise the outcomes, with
the safeguards imposed by the courts reflecting concerns at the pre-
trial stage to protect rights and interests of users, especially potentially
innocent users. It is, however, also hard not to be critical of the
reasoning of the courts in balancing rights and interests, which seems
insufficiently structured. What might this mean for a jurisdiction
such as Australia where, for example, Perram J in Dallas Buyers Club
concluded that, absent a rights-based framework, courts may be pre-
vented from applying proportionality analysis? While the argument
81 Barak, Proportionality, 3.
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cannot be made in full here, this should properly be regarded as part of
broader questions of whether common law courts should incorporate
rights into their reasoning and, if so, how.82 For this chapter, it is
sufficient to observe that in exercising judicial discretion common
law courts, even Australian courts, commonly loosely refer to ‘rights’,
including the right to privacy, but without attempting to pursue the
implications of using this terminology. The flexibility of traditional
common law balancing, however, is such that there may be no insur-
mountable obstacle to courts in exercising broad discretions adopting a
more highly structured approach to identifying and resolving rights
conflicts.
15.6 Conclusion
The ease with which content may be downloaded and disseminated, and
the proliferation of metadata (such as IP addresses) that may be linked to
users, mean that conflicts between copyright and privacy are more
intense online than offline.83 This chapter has suggested that if we are
to take rights seriously, conflicts between copyright and privacy should
be resolved through rights-based reasoning. Adopting a structured,
rights-based framework for analysing conflicts between copyright and
privacy promises more precise, and less subjective and arbitrary, decision
making than multi-factor analyses. But the demands and discipline of
rights-based analyses can be formidable.
Given that courts applying rights-based proportionality and multi-
factor balancing may reach the same conclusions, is there any point in
burdening common law courts with the demands of top-down, rights-
based reasoning? The answer depends upon, first, the extent to which it
is considered important to integrate rights into discretionary judicial
decision making and, second, whether there is a concern to improve
the precision and quality of such decision making. This chapter has
suggested some ways in which judicial analysis of conflicts between
copyright and privacy might be improved, principally by developing rules
of weight or specific guides. Overarching these suggestions, however, is
the prospect that a focus on the substantive relationship between poten-
tially conflicting rights in judicial reasoning may assist in greater
82 See, for example, Michael D Kirby, ‘The role of the judge in advancing human rights by
reference to international human rights norms’ (1988) 62 Australian Law Journal 514.
83 Orit Fischman Afori, ‘Proportionality – A new mega standard in European copyright
law’ (2014) 46 International Review of Intellectual Property and Competition Law 889.
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understanding of those rights, and of the evolving nature of rights online.
In this sense, as acknowledged in Giovanella’s book,84 pre-trial identity
discovery raises broader issues about the nature of judicial reasoning than
those involved in resolving conflicts between copyright and privacy in this
specific context.
84 Giovanella, Copyright and Information Privacy.
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